

Panel 4: Preventing Genocide - the International Architecture of Media and Humanitarian Intervention

Introduction

Allan Thompson: So welcome back. We're about to begin Panel number four, and Panel number four is going to follow the same format, and then it will sort of evolve into a closing session. I have a couple of announcements to make. You should have been presented with a questionnaire at some point during the break. If you haven't received one, volunteers have some more of those. Please fill those in. We'd like to find out what you thought of the event today. I don't know if there's going to be a part two to this conference. I think we could probably have spent the whole weekend here. There may well be. So please fill out the evaluation form. Another very important reminder. Those of you, who have taken out the headsets for translation services. They won't work once you leave this building. So please, as much as you'd like them to. Please return them back to the place where you left your piece of identification as bait at the end.

So to begin our closing session. I would like to reintroduce General Romeo Dallaire, who is going to chair this panel, and when I put a general in charge, I know we're going to get the job done.

General Dallaire: Carry on, carry on Allan. Ladies and gentleman. We'll get into the subject as we'll go to about 5:10, and then Allan will be doing sum up, with opportunities for questions also in that sum up. This panel is particularly projecting into the future, and as our good friend, and grateful American philosopher Yogi Berra said, "The future ain't what it used to be," and so it will be interesting to see that dimension, and in particular, the handling in the arena of prevention if possible, and the interfacing of the media with humanitarian and other structures. I wish only if you may forgive me, one comment from the previous panel. The Security Council on May 7 in its hidden working room actually agreed to use the term "genocide." Although the governments didn't agree, at least internally they did. However, over the following weeks, the term "genocide" did absolutely nothing. It produced absolutely nothing. They lived with it, continued to be totally apathetic, and produced nothing more than great debates, I'm afraid, within the legal dimensions of the term "genocide," and so the term might be there, the commitment, the will to apply it wasn't, and so in these days as we seem to hear the word "genocide" for every event, one must be very leery of using it for when it is really a genocide, and then trying to hold people to it, which is not in recent past been the case. So with that said, we'll commence with Frank Chalk if you would please. Oh he's behind me.



Frank Chalk, Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies

Frank Chalk: I was hoping that you would talk a little longer, because it's very embarrassing when you have a 10 minute presentation and your laptop takes five minutes to boot up. You hope for mercy, but at the moment I do have the same timer that we use earlier, and I think we might actually make it now. My talk looks to the future, as well as the past. It's on the media,

and incitement and prevention, of genocide. And I hope my time will begin when I'm able to actually show you the slides, which I think is imminent, but I'm still getting an hour glass, which all of us who use, ah it's open, which all of us who use Microsoft products know means that Bill Gates is finding out what we've done in the last 24 hours, and it takes him awhile to read the screen, and let us go ahead. While this happening, and again not in my paper, let me just say a word about reporters and genocide and history if I could for just a moment. The name Walter Duranty has not been uttered in this room. He was the New York Times Pulitzer Prize winning reporter, who got his Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the Soviet Union in the 1930's, and who lied knowingly, and with malice and forethought about the famine in Ukraine in the early 1930's. Malcolm Muggeridge, who was then writing for the Manchester Guardian told the truth, and Walter Duranty succeeding in obfuscating an ongoing genocide that starved to death with intent, to destroy a part of the Ukrainian people, some 4-6 million Ukrainians. We still don't know the exact numbers. Sorry this is taking so long General Dallaire. I thought I was not going to be the first presenter. So we didn't try to do this earlier, but I should have assumed I could be, and we should have arranged it, but I still don't have a screen. It's coming though.

The second thing I wanted to say is the case of the Armenian genocide of 1915, in the case of the Holocaust between 1941 and 1945, in the case of the murder ½ million Indonesian supposed communists in 1965, in the case of the murder of approximately 1 million Bengalis and others in Bangladesh in 1971, in the case of the murder of between 100,000 and 300,000 educated Hutu in Burundi, reporters played a very small role. In Bangladesh it helped, or East Pakistan it helped, but in most of these other cases, reporters did not serve as the trip wires or the signalers, and some day we should talk about that, and why? And it's not entirely their responsibility either.

So we now have a screen, and you believe I have a presentation, which is a very good thing, as Martha used to say. All right. We believe that there are four basic motives for genocide in history. I've laid them out here, and the first three are the ones that we don't need to pay too much attention to today; those are the utilitarian genocides. The motives there are crass human greed, the creation of empire. We call these "eliminating real or potential threats, spreading terror among enemies, acquiring economic wealth." They're practical, utilitarian, and they actually produce tangible gains for the people of the perpetrating country in many instances.

Genocide is motivated by ideology, or more interesting from our point of view. They seek a perfect future, inspired by ethno-nationalist utopian or racist goals. The perpetrator demonizes the victim group, excludes it's members from the universe of mutual obligation, and this sets up the genocide to follow, and they produce very few material benefits for the people of the country that's perpetrating the genocide. Perpetrators of ideologically motivated genocides rely much more heavily on the mass media as an instrument of mobilization than perpetrators of utilitarian genocides.

The aim is to demonize the victim group by engendering fear, hatred and violence, and I think everybody up here will recognize what I'm talking about. The method is sustained propaganda to mobilize violence against victims on a grand scale. The technique is to reinforce motivating beliefs through intensively spread eliminationist hate propaganda and disinformation.

The results: a synergism creating panic fear resulting from the propaganda. Convincing ordinary

people to believe that they are killing to preserve their lives, traditional rights and property, murdering victims defined as the only practical policy to be implemented in cold blood. This actually helps us in early warning of genocide, but we have to be listening, and we have to have leaders willing to act. The open mass mobilization of the population by the media to the public encouragement of ordinary people to endorse and join in state supported crimes against humanity and genocide, alerts us in the prediction and early warning of ideologically motivated genocides.

This is a bigger problem in poor countries, developing countries, countries moving from authoritarian to democratic systems, than in most other countries. In these countries, the media has no tradition of independence, no deeply rooted professional standards for journalists, a violent media culture with no sense of responsibility to society as a whole. We see manipulation of journalists by the dominant political faction through bribery and intimidation. Stereotyping and sensationalism as major themes in news stories, stories tending to reduce ethnic tension are overlooked, neglected, set aside. The key, as Mark Froman (?) and Internews has pointed out in it's U.S. Institute of Peace Report, and many of us agree, is to assess the stage which the genocidal situation is reached in order to plan an intelligent intervention, and to devise a response strategy appropriate to that stage. In the early stage, before there are killings, domestic and foreign monitoring of the media, training programs and codes of conduct for local editors and journalists, foreign assistants to strengthen local media, and radio soap operas and drama programs produced by local inter-ethnic teams for children and adults are very useful. Search for common ground has pioneered the latter, and so has BBC actually.

In the middle stage, when there are already some massacres, local journalists, NGOs and government ministers opposed to genocide are neutered or repressed by the government and it's allies, which would roughly correspond to when General Dallaire arrived in Rwanda, or perhaps he was even at the end of that process. Foreign governments, NGOs and international organizations should notify perpetrators their hate propoganda is being monitored and recorded to enable future prosecution. Counter disinformation with more frequent broadcasts of accurate news and local languages, and initiate electronic jamming of hate broadcasters inciting genocide or even more strenuous measures if necessary.

When the genocide is underway, and we call that late stage interventions, and we hope never to get to that, but we may again. We need to destroy the transmitters and printing presses of the hate mongers, broadcast warnings to victims and bystanders that genocide has begun, warn perpetrators to cease and desist, and broadcast feasible routes to safety, and other survival intelligence to potential victims. These techniques have been field tested in bits and pieces in a long list of countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia and Sierra Leone. A long list of organizations, which I won't list that includes Internews, Foundation Hirondelle represented on this panel, as well as Search for Common Ground have tried to implement such measures, and right here in Canada in British Columbia, the Center for War, Peace and the News Media (?) has worked on this.

I want to propose this afternoon a new initiative, an international code of conduct backed by transmitter export control regulations. The landmark media case decision in the media decision of December 3, 2003, confirms, subject to appeal, the UN Genocide Conventions criminalization of media incitements to commit genocide whether or not a genocide results from that

propaganda, that incitement is a crime in itself. What we need now is an international code of conduct, which recognizes the dual use possibilities of t.v. and AM/FM and satellite radio transmitters. The code of conduct should ban the export of transmitters to countries already under international arms embargos, and there should be at least these six criteria for banning the exported transmitters to these countries. Not respecting sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council, violating human rights obligations already embodied in the international treaties the country has signed, refusing export to countries likely to use the equipment to provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions in country of final destination, threatening the national security of states subscribing to the code of conduct, demonstrating disrespect for international law alliances, and the need to contain terrorism, and likely to divert the equipment within the buyer country, etc. These are actually the six criteria, or six of the criteria, which the European Union agreements already explicitly pose.

To this, we should add requirement that the people buying radio equipment must sign an undertaking not to use it for hate propaganda. We know that many times they'll lie and do that, but that will authorize us and legitimate us when we take out those transmitters. We have already had mandatory UN embargos on the following list of countries and regimes when they stood in violation of these agreements ranging from Afghanistan through Yugoslavia. EU weapons embargos have already been imposed on an even longer list ranging from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. That's the direction we need to move, and if you would like further information, I'll put this PowerPoint presentation on the website I've put on the screen, and you're welcome to contact me. Thank you very much. I'll have to get out of here.



Philippe Dahinden, Hironnelle Foundation, which operates media services in crisis areas

General Dallaire: Well done. Thank you very much, and now from the Hironnelle Foundation, Philippe Dahinden, a foundation that I have found exceptionally useful in my involvement with the International Tribunal.

Philippe Dahinden: Thank you. Hello. I am a journalist, and I am very pleased to be able to speak to you today, to speak to so many future young colleagues. In an interview one day, a musician, an African artist said to me, "the words can save people just as they can kill people." That was stated by Baba Maal, the singer from Senegal. Why is that? Well, in May 1994, I spent two weeks in Rwanda as a reporter for Swiss Television like my colleagues earlier. Where as you know, at the time the genocide was taking place. I already knew the country. I knew also the media of hate. It was after the evacuation of foreigners, we were the first, with my cameraman to go as far as Kigali from the south through Butare. We saw a lot, a lot of corpses, too many. That's not what I want to talk to you about today. In fact, when I was there, I was able to realize how information, or rather disinformation, propaganda, how they could actually kill, in a sense, civilians. At every roadblock set up by the militia, the Interehamwe, I could hear the radio, the radio RTL M which was designating the targets to be hit. I could also see that hundreds of thousands of civilians were fleeing, or waiting for the violence to stop. But these civilians had no information at all. All they could rely on were rumors, or the orders of the extremists. And when I sent back to Europe, together with other journalists, I thought that we journalists, we couldn't

just remain impotent looking at this. We did our job as well as we could informing the rest of the world, but these people, the victims of the events, who didn't see our reports, they also deserved information. That's a right, which is as vital as the right to food, or the medical care. They have a right to know. They have the right not to just receive rumors, propaganda, incitement to violence. In other words, they deserve not to be treated as sub-humans. It's really a question of human dignity. So this fundamental right to be informed is what justified our profession, as journalists and the press this is what we demand. So the Rwandan journalists really couldn't do that. The few professionals, who survived such as Thomas, who were themselves in the massacres, they couldn't do their work. Therefore we decided without the journalists from Europe to actually go there to help our colleagues in Rwanda in order to meet this urgent need for information by creating an independent media.

In fact, by putting up a radio station, because there was no radio station there, we thought we would be able to reach out to many people. This radio was Radio Agatashya. Initially, it was designed to counter the hate media, but also to address the population in distress, people escaping genocide, people who were displaced refugees. From the beginning, the mission of the radio station was to give independent audited news. Despite the end of the war and the genocides, the aim was to try and calm hatred, to reduce tension when all this went on, the area you know was still inflamed, and when there was such strong enmity between the groups. So we were able to discover in a zone of conflict how important it was to disseminate information on the spot, to have a media close by in local languages, offered by local journalists. Some time later, we set up the Hironde Foundation. This led to other radio stations around the world: Liberia, Kosovo, Central Africa, Timor, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. You know, information is a weapon, which can kill people when it's manipulated. It's a major issue in conflict, and totalitarian regimes, such as the belligerents themselves try to control information as much as possible. We're sure they can also be an instrument of peace in order to counter propaganda, in order to counter the incitement of violence, and therefore to help to resolve or prevent conflict.

So I'd like to talk a little bit more about Radio Agatashya. It was set up Bukavu, and could be picked up by millions of listeners. It quickly became a regional station in Burundi and Rwanda, but it had to stop two years later because of the war, which was to lead to the overthrow of Mobutu. At that time, they had a correspondent's office, where the international criminal court set up in Arusha. They were able to continue their work to begin the independent agency for Rwandan press, which covered the trial everyday.

Now, as regards the impact of such a radio, I'd just like to give you one specific example. When the war, conducted by Kabila and his allies reached Bukavu, where our radio station was, we described as clearly as possible how the fighting was going. This information was really a bull walk against rumor and panic, particularly when rebel propaganda and falsely or inaccurately announced the presence of soldiers at the gates of the city. The local appeals for calm were sent out by people who were respected, such as the Bishop, the Arch Bishop, and they contributed to reduce tension within the population, and the hostility towards certain groups, who were considered scapegoats, and this didn't stop the conflict going on, but the radio nevertheless did spare lives, and did avoid further suffering.

As regards genocide and its consequences, this is the editorial line we took on information. We gave priority to the right against impunity, and we focused on the need for justice explaining, for example, in local languages what was the role of the International Tribunal, what in fact, was meant by legal concepts, because these weren't known in Rwanda when we talk about things like genocide, or crimes against humanity. As a result, we were able to counter the propaganda of extremists in the camps, who wanted to deny the genocide had taken place. We explained if somebody had been convicted of genocide, this means also that all his descendents would also be banished for life or forever and ever from society. So we explained to these people in simple terms in the local language that responsibility here was individual, not passed on to the descendants. Also we allowed people who escaped to speak also on the radio to explain their reality.

So in summary, this is how the Hironnelle Foundation saw its role in this crisis area, and the role which can be played by what I refer to as peace media, but on their own, of course, they could never stop a conflict. They could never bring a halt to violence. So there's two possible approaches: the one is to broadcast programs advocating peace, for example, theatrical plays on radio showing opposite groups, but actually revealing the differences between the various groups are not that great. The other approach is to offer listeners a credible medium, which reflects as faithfully as possible the reality so as to cut the feet out from propaganda. This is the approach we preferred despite the problems. So we have to try and create a media in a crisis area as if it was in a stable area, with the same rules, the same techniques, and really the main point here, the leading point if you will, is the news, of course, has to be credible. This has to be professional, rigorous, independent, then radio becomes a wonderful instrument against hatred.

If you break this down, and I'll try and do this. If you look at the actual mechanism of incitement to violence, what they try and do is push people towards violence. Propaganda takes a real fact, an actual fact, then distorts it. People exaggerate it. They give it a different interpretation. So this will provoke an emotional reaction by the person who hears this, because they'll want vengeance. I'll give you an example in Burundi, and I learned this also, I mentioned this also in my report, The Massacre of the False Innocents. The information goes around in Burundi and the rebel attack within the city, a hundred Tutsi students were killed, and this represents a future generation. So in Bujumbura, this leads to enormous emotion. Everybody says this, the observers and the military, so therefore we went there. We conducted reports. People refused to talk, and one of our journalists there had somebody speak, and he told us the reality there is that, in fact, it was the students themselves, after a rebel attack, who went actually and massacred the peasants. So it was the exact opposite of what was reported.

So that's why we call it a massacre. There was a false innocence. So if anyone wants to have more information about that, there are as a matter of fact, other journalists here today who were present for that inquiry. So given the facts, all the facts, and nothing but the facts, then we could re-establish the real truth, and sometimes, hopefully, really stop propaganda from working.

So I'd like to add a few other points before I conclude. Most often our radio reports are joint, if you will. They're joint reports from opposite groups, from Hutus and Tutsis, or from Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. It's hard, but good results come from this. It's not just a symbol. It's a way of restoring communication between opponents, and editorial line reflects our mission, dictating

the hierarchy of information. We give a priority, for example, to the peace process, to security, to human rights. And one of our concerns in this symposium is local media. And our projects can open the way up for local media. We can use them than they can broadcast, otherwise they'd expose themselves to risk. So we give them an opening. So as I said at the beginning, the populations or the victims of conflicts really have their dignity rejected. So they see a program, which is intended for them, dedicated to them as a mark of respect, of recognition. It's a way of restoring for them the only thing that they have, which they can't take from them, namely their personal dignity.

And in conclusion, I'd like to quote my colleague Jean-Marie Etter, president of the Hironnelle Foundation, he said, "information really is a way of restoring responsibility and the dignity of our listeners. A radio of peace is also a radio which tries to give to people, who have been victims of war, or abuse of power, to give them some control over their own destiny." Thank you.



Mark Frohardt, Africa Regional Director, Internews – early intervention

General Dallaire: So it's really interesting to see this instrument of a counter attack in an operation. Next is Mark, Frohardt, I'm not sure if I pronounced that well, from African Regional Director Internews, another agency that we found very, very positive in the field.

Mark Frohardt: Thank you very much. And thank you for this invitation to speak today. The reason I was asked to speak today was because of a paper that was published by USIP on the Use and Abuse of Media in Vulnerable Societies, and last night Frank commented on how much we'd packed into that paper, and I'd forgotten just how much until I tried to bring down into about 10 minutes any concise thoughts. I think I have managed to do it, but I'm sure I'll be told if I haven't.

Just as media organization such as Hironnelle Foundation, and Panose (?), conflict resolution organizations, such as Search for Common Ground to use media in their programs. Internews often works with journalists, and other media professionals covering conflict within their own communities. This has led us all to develop specialized strategies for addressing situations of conflict, or situations where conflict seems imminent. However, changing the way the media report on current affairs, becomes increasingly difficult the closer a society comes to conflict. In many situations, media assistance programs are simply prohibited by military or political authorities, as they themselves have a vested interest in manipulating the media. When we started looking at ways to determine how and where that we could intervene earlier, we found the various methodologies by different organizations for identifying societies in which violence conflict is likely to occur, and substantial research into the root causes of conflict. What we didn't find, was any significant reference to the use of media in influencing a society toward or away from conflict, and this is where our research began. We started looking for indicators that were based on the evaluation of local media that identified societies in which the media was vulnerable to manipulation, particularly in the use of mobilizing sectors of a population to violent conflict. We entered these indicators also to inform us as to the type of intervention that

was required to strengthen local media in order to resist that manipulation.

Our research resulted in a framework consisting of two categories of indicators: those concerning media structure, the way that the media sector is set up. This includes journalist competence, media variety and plurality, and the media's legal environment, and indicators dealing with media content. And these are the indicators, which examine the programming that media outlets produce. The two categories that we found most significant there: one is to content, which instills fear. The other creates a sense that conflict is inevitable. And Rwanda is a case study in all of these. But I won't go into any of the detail there.

This led us to three types of interventions: structural intervention, which starts before the abuse of the media is really evident. Content specific intervention, which can start earlier, but usually targets the manipulation of the media in it's earlier stages, and aggressive intervention, which we've heard a lot about especially with regard to Rwanda, the recommendations for radio jamming.

I'm going to focus this afternoon specifically on the structural intervention, because I feel this is the most important, and ultimately the most beneficial. The most effective strategy for strengthening a professional media sector and protecting it's content from biased influence is through reforms and media structure. Structural reforms have many advantages over interventions that target only content. If they're carried out early enough, they can prevent media abuse from taking place at all. Structural reforms can also go a long way toward obviating future attempts to manipulate the media during periods of social stress. Once in place, these reforms are no longer dependent on foreign assistance, and this is a very important point. So they tend to maintain legitimacy, and they build popular support.

I'm going to mention just very briefly seven types of the structural interventions, just to give you some sense of the comprehensive nature as it is really of any type of this kind of intervention to really be able to do something at a structural level. And the point here is that it is not any one of these interventions, but the more of them that can be implemented, the better chance that they will be successful.

The first is strengthening independent media. This strengthening is often the product of media plurality, financial viability and longevity, all of which make using media to incite violence increasingly difficult. Plurality creates strength in numbers, with a variety of diverse, independent outlets in place if one or several are co-opted, the results are mitigated. Through media expansion and diversification, hate media can be marginalized as it is, for example, in the United States. Longevity contributes to the strength of independent media, because the longer outlets are in place, the more ingrained in society they become, and the more likely that people will make a large outcry if they are shut down, or abused or manipulated.

The next is, finally, independent outlets also must be financially viable enterprises. When journalists lack the requisite resources to do their job, they are more susceptible to co-optation and corruption.

Next is developing journalist competence. The principle method for enhancing human resources

is through training, often through peer-to-peer to training conducted by journalists, producers, editors and managers. Investigative journalism is critical to blocking efforts to incite conflict, and debunk the inflammatory myths and stereotypes propagated in media. Journalists trained in investigative journalism are more likely to investigate and report on those who are attempting to abuse the media, and to expose their intentions, which can deter or thwart their efforts.

The next is working with the legislature and the judiciary, or government institutions affecting the media. Particular attention should be paid to the legislature, because of its capacity to make and modify law. In many societies susceptible to media abuse, legislation necessary to prosecute media abuse, including legislation that protects independent or private media outlets, and legislation that addresses hateful or antagonistic media content, such as slander and libel is absent, ineffective or poorly designed. Once the necessary media legislation is in place, it is equally important that the judiciary has the capacity to enforce laws. Among the recommendations of the organization Article 19, following the Rwandan genocide was that the government should seek to strengthen the judiciary to ensure that the necessary steps can be taken within the domestic legal system to prevent the broadcasting to incitement to violence.

Next is promoting diversity in the journalist core and in media ownership, and this one is not easy, but it can be done. One strategy for promoting diversity among journalists is to impress upon the management and ownership of media outlets how they can benefit commercially from diversity. The increased listenership, increased advertising revenues. Promoting diversity in the media ownership is even more complex, but one route is through bilateral aid, particularly aid channelled from development banks through national financial institutions intended for developing small and middle-sized businesses.

The next is licensing and regulation of media outlets. Starting the media outlet should not be an overly complex, time consuming bureaucratic task, nor should regulation be so lax that just anybody at random can start their own radio station. International NGOs can provide the strong impetus for establishing regulations and provide a blueprint for how to implement such regulations.

The next is strengthening domestic and international networks. Because journalists in vulnerable societies are often isolated from both domestic and international colleagues, establishing and strengthening journalist networks can be an effective strategy for combating media abuse. Domestically this can be accomplished through journalist associations and unions, but also broader regional and international networks are helpful, as they provide awareness of international standards of professional journalism, which serve as a basis from which journalists may feel justified beyond their own personal conviction to resist manipulation, because they enjoy the support of a network, and feel part of a larger community of journalists that adhere to a common standard.

Finally, because of these networks, actors with intent to manipulating media may be more hesitant to do so if every time they apply pressure behind the scenes, their actions are made public by either local or international media. Foundation Hironnelle, Search for a Common Ground, Panose(?), and other media organizations that work in these situations are quite familiar at one level or another with these various types of interventions. And I'm going to conclude with

one, which I think we think about at times, but have had very little success in really dealing with, because it's normally thought to be outside of our domain, and that is the demand side intervention. The problem often found in societies in which media abuse occurs, and in societies with underdeveloped media in general, is that media consumers, everyday citizens, rarely consider and question the source and credibility of their news. As Alison Des Forges pointed out earlier, during the genocide, most ordinary people saw no reason to call into question the voice of authority that they heard through RTLM radio broadcasts. As Rwandans had never been exposed to alternatives to state-owned or controlled media, they had little understanding of the bias, which is inherent in all media outlets. Increased public education is not the only approach to enhancing awareness of how media outlets operate. B92, the famous radio station in Serbia, tried to create such an understanding. As one of the managers of the station once said, "the idea was to provoke the public to start thinking about the information they were receiving, and this was the journalists, who were doing this themselves. And also to encourage people not to be passive recipients of information, but to question everything they heard." Ultimately if there is little demand side public pressure on media to improve their content and behaviour, there is little incentive for media outlets to change.

I'll just conclude very briefly with just mentioning by title the four recommendations that we came up with at the end of this, and that is that: 1) media in vulnerable societies should be monitored, 2) there should be a greater collaboration between media organizations and conflict resolution organizations in exchange of information, developing methodologies, and shared programming, and 3) media organizations, need along with conflict resolution organizations need to build a better case for monitoring and early intervention to encourage appropriate donor support. This is not going to happen at the last moment. This really is something that is terrain needs to be prepared for this, and donors also need to be prepared and engaged, long before these kinds of things start. And finally, is a systematic review of media behaviour in vulnerable societies should be conducted, and I've been told that research which concludes with a recommendation for more research is one of the last things that one should do, but there really is a need for much more to be done, especially to convince donors that they needed to invest in these situations earlier. Thank you.



Paul Heinbecker, inaugural director of the Centre for Global Relations, Governance and Policy at Wilfrid Laurier University

General Dallaire: Very gutsy recommendations indeed. Now, Master Paul Heinbecker, who is from a new Centre of International Governance and Innovations. Sir.

Paul Heinbecker: Thank you very much. I should probably tell people that I have served on the Security Council, not on the Security Council during the time of Rwanda, but I have been there. So I will have some comments to make on that. What I really wanted to talk about, what I'm asked to talk about, is the way forward. At the UN, as we speak, there's an effort being made to reform what the Security Council does. It's been lost, so to speak, in translation, because a lot of the discussion is about who is going to be on the Security Council. One of the arguments made by South Africa, for example, is that if South Africa had been on the Security Council during the

Rwanda genocide, there would have been a permanent voice of a powerful African country, and the attitude of the Security Council might have been different. I leave you to judge whether that is the case or not, but nonetheless, as we speak, the UN is trying to address itself to three questions, all having to do with sovereignty and intervention. The most fundamental question is the issue of military intervention in cases of humanitarian need. The document which is on the table, and there are many of them on the table, is this document here, which is available to people outside the room. Many of you will already know about it. It's called "The Responsibility to Protect." It's a commission that was commissioned during the time of Foreign Minister Axworthy, and it comprised senior people from around the world. They went around the world. They met everywhere. They met in the wake of the scandals, and the shame and the failures of Rwanda, and Bosnia, and initially at least in East Timor, and the Congo. It was in response to Kofi Annan's challenge, and the challenge is stated at the beginning, and it reads as follows, "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, or to a Zerbunitzu (?), to gross and systematic violations of human rights, that effect every precept of our common humanity?"

The challenge we gave the commission was to change the vocabulary, and to change the way people think. Here we had a contradiction in the UN Charter itself. The UN Charter, written 55 or 60 years ago for other circumstances, has as it's most basic principle to protect succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and Article 2 of the Charter embodies the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states members, sovereignty. Over time those two basic precepts of the UN Charter come into conflict with each other, because increasingly as we've seen, the conflicts are within states that's the fundamental issue, which is now on the table at the UN.

There are two other issues that are equally pressing, or almost equally pressing, and they're also things which the UN is going to have to come to grips with. One is intervention on the issues of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, on the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. At what point is the international community justified in interfering in the internal affairs of the state? And a further question has to do with the overthrow of legitimately and duly elected governments. At what point is the international community justified in stepping in and restoring democratically elected governments? We've just had a fairly confusing case on Haiti. But I would urge people to remember that hard cases make bad law.

This document has been described by some significant people, I think, among them Anne-Marie Slaughter, who is the Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, as some of the best foreign policy thinking in the last 50 years, and I commend it to you. I'll take you through it very briefly in a moment. I think I'll use the Iraq case as a case in point, and take you through some of the basic principles.

The Canadian objective when we established this commission, was to make the responsibility to protect the norm. We'd heard a lot about the right to intervene. It was the wrong way around on this issue. It made people nervous, but the responsibility to protect put the emphasis on the right side of the equation on protection and on people.

You would think then, given everything that's gone on, that this would be a relatively easy sell. I

can tell you that we have got almost nowhere with this issue at the United Nations, not that we've given up, but that it's been very difficult. A lot of the difficulty have come from African countries themselves. The Latin Americans, when they think about intervention are thinking about the Monroe Doctrine, and about relations they've had in the past with the United States. When the Asians think of intervention, they're thinking about their near complete lack of cohesion. There is no kind of regional organization that really speaks for the Asians on these questions, and they are very attached, and I've put it to them in these terms, very attached to 18th century, 17th century excuse me, European ideas of sovereignty. For people who care a lot about Asian values, it's surprising how attached they are to the Treaty of Westphalia.

The Europeans for their part are basically in a post-intervention mode. I think they have learned from their terrible history, and we have something to learn from them, but the continent which has surprised me in it's reticence, and maybe I shouldn't have been surprised, has been Africa. When we promoted the responsibility to protect, some people said that they were sceptical, because they thought there was no interest. There was going to be too little intervention, and others were sceptical because they thought there would be too much intervention.

I say perhaps I should have understood that the Africans would be reticent about an idea coming from another side of the planet, on how to make things better in Africa. Given the colonial background, the slave trade, perhaps we should not have been too surprised when people showed up from the other side of the earth, and said we had an idea that was good for them. I can understand that, but it isn't clear to me how we're going to move forward if that remains the basis of our dialogue with each other. If this is about the past, and it's about colonialism, then it's going to be very difficult to move forward. Some of those African governments no doubt, were self-interested, as others are, in not setting up a situation in which they might be the subjects of intervention. But even for ordinary people, I suppose it's quite understandable when you think about it, when they're invited to accept a brand new idea that they're told by people that they don't know very well, is going to be very good for them.

But I want to tell you just how difficult it was. We could not get in the UN General Assembly, agreement among members, I'm talking here primarily about the General Assembly now, because some people think the General Assembly is some kind of improvement on the UN Security Council. We could not get agreement even to discuss this report. We could not get agreement even to discuss this report, just by the countries who were interested in it at their own expense. We were blocked by countries like Cuba, and Pakistan and Libya. I don't want to leave out any of the bad guys. I wouldn't want to offend them. We could not get the General Assembly even to take up a discussion of this. The hope for this report now primarily, is in the Secretary General's reform efforts, because the chairman of this commission is a member of that reform commission, the new one the Secretary General has set up, and they are going to be reporting in the fall, and this is quite close to the centre of what's being discussed.

I want to talk a second about the Security Council. I've sat on the Security Council, as I've said. I've been behind those closed doors. Everything that happens behind the closed doors is not edifying. Everything that happens in front of those closed doors is not edifying either. When you have a debate, and you invite everybody to speak, and you get 56 countries talking about something, very often that's the end of the story. I think the Security Council has made progress.

It's made progress under pressure from countries like us, and others, to be more transparent, to be more open. We, for example, virtually forced the Security Council to talk about the International Criminal Court in public. They wouldn't only talk about it in public, but they wanted to have, and this is two years ago, you can look it up, as they say. They wanted to have their discussion behind closed doors. They wanted to come out, and vote on it, and then if anybody had anything to say, we could say it afterwards. It took two letters from the Canadian delegation to the president of the Security Council, circulated to every UN member, reminding them of their ambitions for transparency and accountability, and saying we couldn't think of an issue, which was more important to discuss publicly than that.

General Dallaire: One minute.

Paul Heinbecker: I think I just want to make two points; one is on Iraq, one is more generally. I invite you to look at the synopsis of this book when you get a chance. You don't even have to read the rest of it. I think you'll want to read the rest of it once you've seen the synopsis. It establishes basic principles for intervention. It makes a point that sovereignty is responsibility. The most basic responsibility of the state is to protect its people, and if it can't or won't, that responsibility then devolves on the international community. It sets out a number of principles, particularly the threshold, and the threshold is, I quote, "large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended with genocidal intent or not," and it sets out a number of precautionary principles. Let's just take the Iraq War, because I fear the Iraq War has had a very negative effect on this debate.

If you look at the 2003 State of the Union speech, you didn't see human security as an objective of the Iraq War. What you saw in there, excuse me for this microphone, what you saw in there, was weapons of mass destruction and terrorism and urgency. The Iraq War would not have met the tests of this particular set of principles. The first principle is right intention. It was, perhaps the right intention 10 years earlier would have been an intervention. The intention at this particular time was weapons of mass destruction.

The second precautionary principle is last resort. It's pretty evident from what we know now, and indeed what we knew then, that this war was not a last resort. I think the war would have met the tests of proportionality, and maybe even of reasonable prospects of success, but finally the question, and this goes to Alison Des Forges' point, and that is who decides? Who has the authority to decide? I invite people to read an opinion written by Mr. Blix, the UN arms inspector, who is also prior to that Swedish Foreign Minister and Swedish legal advisor. In his view, the Security Council owns the decision to intervene in Iraq, as it does on every other issue.

But we've been through Kosovo, and by the way, I would make the point that because you can't intervene everywhere doesn't mean you shouldn't intervene where you can. We've been through Kosovo and the Security Council wouldn't decide. Do we make a doctrine of going around the Security Council, or do we just accept it?

The last point, because I know we're running out of time. You know, when you get old, General, you know you like to hear your own voice.

General Dallaire: I've heard the same thing about generals too.

Paul Heinbecker: Somebody said, and I defer to the academics here, but people who tell you that there is no CNN effect, or that it doesn't work, I think are making a big mistake. I don't know what the empirical research is, but I have three examples to tell you. I watched on Bosnia, a town hall meeting in which President Clinton was on a stage, taking questions from around the world, and onto the screen came, from CNN Christiane Amanpour, and she said, "Mr. President, people ..." she was on from Sarajevo, "people are being slaughtered here tonight. You're the most powerful man in the world. Why aren't you doing something about it?" And Clinton literally recoiled, like that. It was a powerful question, and it wasn't very much longer before the United States was more involved.

The second point, in Canada, when we saw, and this is the eastern Zaire crisis of '96, which was a kind of continuation of the Rwanda war, when we saw the people in the camps by a million, and we saw on Canadian television, and we were told that these people were going to perish if nothing was done, that was a powerful galvanizer for action. If people think that public servants and politicians don't react to that kind of thing, I think whatever the research is, I can tell you we react here. And the last case was Kosovo. When those Europeans saw the trains with people on the trains being carried across Europe again, that evoked such powerful memories of what happened in the Second World War, that it had a strong effect on the positions of the governments concerned. So the long and the short of it is the journalists really do have a role to play in these things.



Question Period

General Dallaire: As the subject is preventing genocide, some of the examples before we enter the next phase of this panel. Two weeks before the Americans launched into Iraq, the President of United States stated on the State of the Union, which is more and more becoming State of the World, he said that the United States is not going to do like the UN and what it did in Rwanda, it's going to intervene. When we know ladies and gentlemen that, in fact, the United States was one of the leading countries that prevented the intervention in Rwanda, you got to wonder about history, and the idea and the aims of that nation in prevention. Sir.

Jean-Marie Higirot, Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at Western New England College, former Director of the Rwandan Information Office: My first question, I would like to come back to the intervention made by the last speaker, and also by Frank Chalk. Who would make the decisions if there are early warnings of genocide? Who will determine that a genocide is about to occur? And somebody supposedly was mentioned, who would implement those responses? Recently, I was browsing the Internet, and somehow I came across a report on Ethiopia. Somehow there is a group in Ethiopia, who is being killed. Now, we do know that some countries in Africa have leaders, who are the darling sons of the most powerful countries in the world. So how would you then intervene? These are people who have a lot of support. That is my first question.

General Dallaire: Yes please, response?

Frank Chalk: Okay. I'm not sure whether you're referring to the Oromo or the Anuak, but I'll respond, because it's a general problem, as well as a specific problem. It would be dishonest of anybody to claim that the chances for intervention in an ongoing mass killing are high when that country is under the protection, and in an alliance with the most powerful nations on the face of the earth. So let's start there. Let's recognize that. That's true. It's highly unlikely. In the case of East Pakistan in 1971, the alliance between China and Pakistan discouraged the United States from intervening, and Henry Kissinger supported continued military assistance to the army of West Pakistan for fear, we talk about the most powerful nation on earth, but he was engaged in his China diplomacy, and he was using Pakistan as a conduit, and he didn't want to offend the generals in Pakistan, and so he refused to cut off all of the military aid going to Pakistan, while 10 million refugees were forced to flee to India, and approximately 1 million were killed, and tens of thousands of Bengali women were raped. And not much was done until India, which had no reason to be loyal to the United States, took the opportunity of all these refugees flooding into their camps, to intervene. India then suffered international condemnation, lost its western foreign aid, became more reliant on the Soviet Union as a consequence, and paid for many years for this.

I'll be brief here, I'll just give you one more example, in 1978-79, Vietnam invaded Cambodia after being provoked by the Khmer Rouge regime on numerous occasions, overthrew the most murderous regime we've ever seen in southeast Asia, and was penalized for that act by being denied foreign aid again for many years to come, and condemned by the United Nations for transgressing national borders. So let's recognize not only that the odds are slim of getting great power intervention, but also that even those nations that seek to intervene will pay a price. I'm not arguing they had humanitarian motives for these interventions, but they did stop these ongoing genocides. However, I think Ambassador Heinbecker has pointed to a very important new development, and I want to pass it over to him now, or pass the mic over to him now so he can comment on this, because I think this fantastically good report that the commission has brought in, which I have read, and which was distributed in January at the Stockholm Conference on the Prevention of Genocide, marks a real landmark of creative and rigorous new thinking about what we can do, but it will all happen within the framework that the question gave us.

Paul Heinbecker: On who decides, and whether anybody decides, after the presentation of this commission report, there was a retreat of the Security Council. They have them periodically, and the Secretary General asked the countries present, in light of what was happening in Burundi at the time, whether they would be prepared to intervene, and it transpired as the discussion took place that none of the major powers, the representatives of none of the major powers who were present at this retreat, thought that their countries would intervene. That if the same thing began to happen in Burundi that happened in Rwanda, there would be no intervention. I don't actually believe that. It may be just a personality trait, maybe I'm foolishly optimistic, but I think the world has got that message. I think when you look at what the French did in Bunya, the British action in Sierra Leone, some sort of intervention that took place in Liberia, I think that we are making progress. We've seen some mandates for UN missions that required them to protect civilians. Not very much, but some. When you think about it, Canadians I'm sure, assume that

peacekeeping missions are there to protect people, and they'd be shocked to read the mandates to find that that isn't the case. Sorry.

General Dallaire: Thank you.

Jean-Marie Higiroy: My last question is addressed to Philippe Dahinden. In those countries where there are indications that genocide could be perpetrated, and often these are countries with dictatorial systems of government. If you want to intervene, when would you intervene? Because if you intervene after the genocide, then it's too late to do anything. Of course, you can use the media in order to encourage reconciliation, but I would imagine that intervention should take place beforehand in a country, as I said, which is run by a dictatorship. So what can be done? So where should you start?

Philippe Dahinden: Well in my view, this leads to a broader question, a more wide ranging question than we can address here, that is the actual right of interference. If you want to provide information to a country which refuses it, which gives no possibility for the domestic journalists, or even less international journalists, who are working with the domestic or international journalists in such a case, then we have to ask a question, that is could it be done from the outside for a limited time in conditions which we've just heard? For example, the question is when is it possible to come and assist a civil population that is being manipulated and mistreated? When can information be given from outside the country? I think really, that the real problem, is to decide what security to those people working in that kind of operation, because inevitably there have to be journalists there inside the country. Today, with Internet and other means, then in a quite discrete way you can get information out, but you have to recognize that these journalists will be very exposed.

So I'd say one other thing also, namely, unfortunately we often come too late. For example, the situation really is so locked up, that we weren't able to get in before. Foreign organizations such as ours, or people who work in our organization, well it's also because there's no geopolitical interest of the international community, therefore they won't fund or assist this kind of project, but there are situations where unfortunately the crisis is repeated. For example, the Great Lakes region, we came there too late for the genocide, because by the time we set up a radio station, this takes about a month, a month and a half, it was a bit too late unfortunately, but then other things happened in the region, and I think that while in those we did help a little bit to prevent some.

General Dallaire: Very good. Thank you very much. Now a few questions. Any questions from the floor. We've got about 10 minutes left. So I'll start on the right side. That has nothing to do with my political sympathies. Go ahead young man.

Unknown questioner: Thank you very much. I'm an international consultant. We can see really a failure of institutions in general, beginning with the United Nations, going onto government, western government, of course, the armies also, the church also or churches. So we can see really there is a failure here on the part of institutions. Everyone saw this. Everyone knew this when they saw the genocide which took place in Rwanda, nothing was done. So what we see here by reviewing the situation now, well we can conclude is a failure. So I'll come to my

question now to Dr. Frank, or Paul, or General Dallaire could answer also. The institution that I would propose, that I would dream of is it here, do we have something, namely university, research, information? Am I dreaming when I say that if I were to propose that? That you can abolish national armies, is that just a dream, or is it something that could be considered, that is abolishing national armies in order to set up an armed institution, which has a monopoly of violence there. Thank you very much.

General Dallaire: Thank you, thank you. An answer please, I think he asked you the question.

Frank Chalk: Why don't you start this time?

General Dallaire: Yes. So the question is quite simple, the institutions in place at the present time, which have failed, could they be replaced? Could they be replaced by another structure of institutions, and particularly could be eliminate the armed forces in the future so as to promote the cause of peace and humanity? I think that's a fair summary. Please go ahead.

Frank Chalk: I can pick it up. I just didn't want to hog it. I heard my name. When I interviewed the military liaison officer between the Pentagon and the State Department, who was in place at the time of the Rwanda genocide, and also had been active in the Somalia sphere in 1993, he said to me, both about Somalia and about Rwanda, "the American military could have handled this assignment." Many officers of the American army were devastated by President Clinton's decision that for political reasons, the American Armed Forces should be withdrawn from Somalia. We heard a lot about the Joint Chiefs of Staff at high level, but in the middle level ranks of the American Armed Forces, and among the Special Forces, and others who knew the situation well, they were devastated. They didn't want to leave after suffering a handful of casualties. General Dallaire actually sounds to me, when he points out that a relatively small number of deaths in the American army caused the withdrawal, like these American army officers. They're not happy about it any more than he is, or we are. So I don't think it's just a dream that we'll have action. I think that a lot of the military in the western democracies, and the British in Sierra Leone were another example, are willing to take responsibility. Yes it may happen through executive outcomes at the beginning, then they may have to switch to the real army, etc., but I think the will is there. The problem is not the military. The problem we have with the military is that guys like me, who oppose the war in Viet Nam in the late '60s, and early '70s, before there was Somalia, did a pretty good job. And American politicians certainly are still afraid of what we call "The Vietmalia syndrome," the integration of the two; Vietnam and Somalia. But I think it was General Bush, who said to us in 1998 on the 50th anniversary of the UN Genocide Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he said, "Chalk, you sound like one of those B-52 liberals calling on us to intervene," and I said, "yes General, I have become a B5-2 liberal after all of those years." And I think there is a lot of popular support for intervention.

General Dallaire: Anybody else?

Paul Heinbecker: I would just like to add I don't think the problem is with the military, it is with the government, and if there's a deficit at the UN, the deficit is in the membership. The UN is not some independent entity that can act or not act. It really is with the governments, and

we've seen, as I said with that anecdote with President Clinton, that people do make a difference in either direction in that case.

General Dallaire: Very rapidly if I may. When the Kofi Annan went and asked the nations to provide troops, there was an entente that had been signed in September of 1993, where 68 nations had agreed that if Kofi Annan needs troops, they would respond. All 68 nations refused to send any troops. On January 13, which is two days after January 11 fax where we described in great detail what was going to happen including the massacres, and the support of other information on massacres, and we informed the 'big three' in Rwanda of that. None of them, even through their ambassadors were prepared to have their forces intervene in a proactive fashion. They couldn't substantiate it back home. If sending troops in there prevented it from happening, was that the right decision? Did, in fact, did they have to send the troops, and did they have to spend all that money and risk other situations? None of them had the fundamental courage to take that risk of going in, solving a problem that may have never appeared in the eyes of the population.

Lastly, the doves of the Cold War, and now the hawks of this era, and I believe fundamentally that what we're asking our military is not to fight wars in the classic sense, but in fact, to acquire a whole new set of skills. Skills that are in conflict resolution in which we can, in fact, resolve conflicts, participate in an integrative way with the humanitarians and the diplomats in a whole new sequence of solutioning these complex problems versus the old Cold War methods of a military plan, a civilian plan, and so on. So there's great optimism in the future use of forces as long as you can move away the conservatives, who are simply expecting World War Three to happen next week. Sir.

Unknown questioner: Thank you. My question is to any member of the panel, even to the organizer of this conference. The role of the media as we pointed out, the positive role of the democratic media in the prevention of catastrophes, such as genocide, but sometimes at first sight, a word which seems to be quite innocuous lead to an unexpected or undesired result. For example, as we're approaching the 10th anniversary, if you will, of the genocide against the people in Rwanda, the media tend to use the term "genocide" of the people of Rwanda. Was there, in fact, a Rwandese genocide, a Rwanda genocide? There was an Armenian genocide committed. There was a Jewish genocide also committed by the Nazis, but there was a genocide of the people of Rwanda? We know that the people who were targeted at the time were Tutsi, moderate Hutu also, and democratic people were massacred also, but for the genocide, it was the Tutsi. So I think really we should have the courage really to call a spade a spade here. Don't you think if we're to do that, it might contribute, if we were to take this approach to tend to forget certain aspects involved here?

General Dallaire: Well I will answer that if I may, that essentially the Rwanda genocide, one, it's the Rwandan people, who actually committed the genocide, and in this context you have to use that term. Now the target wasn't only the Tutsi, but it was also moderates around them, but particularly the major target was the destruction of a philosophy of life, a philosophy of a nation, that is the philosophy of reconciliation, and they eliminated this philosophy, and in so doing, they eliminated at the same time hundreds of thousands of Tutsis. Anybody else? We one more question.

Unknown questioner: Natalie (?) from the International Bureau for Children's Rights in Montreal. I'll ask my question in English. I don't have the training as a journalist. So it might seem a bit naïve, my question. I know that certain non-governmental organizations choose not to speak out against certain violent events. So when you decide to become a journalist, when you work for a press agency, when you actually observe or hear about violent events, which are disturbing, does the question arise? That is, should you publish or not? Should you report the news or not regardless, of the reason chosen to do so, not to do so? And if the question does arise, what are the obstacles you have to overcome? And is there a more conducive time when you decide to publish your piece of news of when you're a journalist, because you're sure, or can you always be sure that you will, in fact, be able to report disturbing piece of news?

Philippe Dahinden: Well I'll answer first, because I guess it directed to me. In a zone of conflict, there's no reason not to give the same information as elsewhere, but you need to be a lot more rigorous about it. You have to be a lot more vigilant is the term we used today, because the consequences could be enormous. But I think if you don't give information, it's worse, because then there'll be rumors. There'll be disinformation. Therefore you have to take certain precautions as a journalist. When you're talking about very sensitive information, when you're in an area, where there's a great deal of violence, so you have to stick only to the facts. Don't make any comment, and do this in such an austere way as possible, and the most sober way possible. I'll give you two examples. I was in Bukavu. There was a demonstration by students, which was put down by Mobutu's military, and two people were killed. The national radio would never have dared talk about that. We talked about it. But we simply said that a demonstration had been organized by the students for a certain reason, that the force of order considered the public order had been disturbed. They intervened, and there were two people killed. Two people died. We didn't repeat it 10 times for two weeks. That's an example that I can give you.

The second point was recently. In the radio station, which I put up with other journalists in the Congo in Kisangani, a larger city, a large town by the Congo River, there was a mutiny. They tried to take over, the military mutineers, they took over the radio station in the morning. There were massacres, killings in working class areas, and when we broadcast the news, we were the only one to have the news, because even the military people there were not able to go into that neighborhood. So our journalists collected evidence in Swahili, the language that is spoken in that region. We listened 10 times, 20 times for a long time. We had it translated by a Swahili journalist to be sure that we're going to broadcast something, which could not be interpreted. For example, there was one person, who said, "I saw the military arrive. They killed everyone." No doubt he was telling the truth, given what he himself had seen, but we didn't have a number there. If we had, in fact, broadcast that, that interview as such, then it could have been far open to interpretation, therefore we got rid of it. So have to be very vigilant. I remember we on after midnight, listening to each piece of evidence, and choosing only those, which we could be sure could not be interpreted in a different way. However, we did say the truth. We did repeat what people said in the neighborhood. That's something else, which is very interesting is that these people said to us, "But is the UN doing? The UN is there to observe the corpses. There's UN mission, people are being killed, and the UN is doing nothing." And the radio station, which we set up, Radio Okapi, we set that up in cooperation with the UN, and the UN played along. It admitted this radio station was able to criticize it, or disseminate information criticizing. So except in exceptional cases, where you put in danger thousands of people by giving information,

I mean in hostage taking incidents. There are cases, of course, where you have a very limited ability, and really have to keep the information quiet, but that's exceptional. In most cases, you can find a way of saying it. You have to give the information, and if not you must realize that it will leave the field open to rumors, and for example in Bukavu, people will tell you that hundreds of students were killed, others would say something else. So it's far better just to tell the truth.

General Dallaire: Thank you. We've got permission for two other questions very quickly. Please go ahead quickly.

Unknown questioner: Thank you. Good day. I'm (?). I'm a survivor of the Tutsi genocide. I was in Rwanda in '94, and I worked as a journalist for five years in Rwanda. I saw that very few people spoke about journalists, who were killed during the genocide. You talked at length about the genocide media, and journalists, who propagated hatred, but there's a risk here. We might tend to overlook the fact that many journalists had, in fact, resisted this hate propaganda, and did fight the genocide right to the death. Kangura, everyone knows Kangura now, but very few people know about Kanguka, which was poles apart from Kangura, and the head of this was killed. I think we risk having genocide without victims, and if mechanisms were set in place to keep alive the memory with concrete facts, for example, if there was a fund, an award which could be set up for journalists, who were gallant, who died because of their bravery. Secondly, in Ottawa, we have an association, Humura which is organizing the 10th commemoration of genocide...

General Dallaire: Well it's here, please ask your question.

Unknown questioner: My question is how should we think about this. How can we possibly remember these people? Humura wants to set up a reference library on genocide. We would ask the authors of works on genocide to contribute copies to this reference library. If you contribute, I'd be very grateful. Thank you.

General Dallaire: Well thank you very much for wanting to immortalize, as you put it, the genocide, and there's no doubt that through journalists, who conduct investigations, who raise certain questions as a result of this, they probably will not forget the scope of this genocide, the fact the genocide took place, although some people do tend to forget it. We'll end with you. I'd like to thank everybody else. Also we're not taking any more questions.

Unknown questioner: Thank you. My question is for Mark Frohardt, I'm sorry I can't see that far. Regarding your study, among your conclusions was that the monitoring and reviewing of vulnerable media was crucial. I was wondering if you meant internal monitoring by academics, or by governments, or by the media, institutions themselves, or external, and secondary to that, what will you do with the results of this monitoring? How would you turn them into real and useful information for people to act on?

Mark Frohardt: First of all, thank you for the question. I was wondering how overwhelming my presentation was, or underwhelming. In any case, I would say that one of the things that I tried to focus on here in this paper, which can be found at the USIP website if one wants to look

at it more extensively. It does look at various forms of intervention, later forms of intervention, but for me I think that the most important is the earliest, because that is when you can actually create a local capacity to address these problems where you don't have to wait until it gets to a point where the interventions demand a more large scale force, whether it be military or humanitarian. So in this case with regard to monitoring and evaluation, the most effective form of monitoring of the media is done by peer review. It is done when journalists monitor themselves, when they establish organizations. They establish associations. They develop ethical codes of conduct, and they criticize each other when they start to report in a non-professional fashion. And so I would say that we would always support the idea of working at a level that would try and foster that type of development and peer review. Unfortunately, as we've seen in Rwanda and elsewhere, there are several situations, which get much too far along the way, where that is not possible, and as Philippe has mentioned earlier, there are situations in which it's impossible for media organizations to do much of anything. And in those cases, there needs to be something, which is external. There needs to be some type of international forum or a system for monitoring. The United States has FBIS, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. BBC has BBC monitoring. There have been local monitoring systems set up, for example, in conflict areas, or post-conflict areas, for example, in East Timor. All of these are noble efforts, but none of them are comprehensive enough now to actually have a network, where people are going to really pay attention, especially in some of the most vulnerable societies. There are societies where media is vulnerable. Those are a lot of times not the ones which are being covered by these monitoring organs.

So what I would say is that there needs to be a more structure for monitoring, but that needs to include organizations, which not only can help gather that information, and help the development of local organizations that can gather this information, but also can have an agreed-on plan on what they are going to do with it, and that's the reason why I mention the importance of working with donors and international institutions ahead of time, because we need to be able to first of all, have the systems in place to monitor, but then we also have to have a system in place of what we're going to do when we identify there are problems. And so yes there does definitely need to be an international effort, but at the same time, we would like to think that you could start locally first.

General Dallaire: Well thank you very much gentlemen. If I may conclude this before we hand over to our leader. It is my experience, and as I go across the country talking about conflict and conflict resolution, it seems to me that the future of many of the organs that may prevent conflict lays in the hands of the NGOs. And I consider the NGO community to be still a very immature structure, and it doesn't realize the full potential that it can have, and certainly journalists, who can work not only their professional and direct missions and roles that they have, but also strengthen international journalists, NGOs can I think do a lot in enhancing their position within the world of conflict and conflict resolution. Thank you.

Allan Thompson: Thank you very much. I'm going to use the prerogative of the chair to move us to a close, and I think we will actually finish precisely on time. Believe it or not in a room full of journalists, lawyers, diplomats and academics, we've actually kept to this pace, one diplomat only, at least at the table. A lot of people have made the point that this has been a very quick exercise. This has been a compressed examination of these issues. I don't know about you, but I

feel as if I have been here for two or three days at this point. And yet, I don't want this event to end. I just want to remind you of a few things how in many ways, this event is not going to end. This is the beginning of a process. From a technical point of view, Extreme Web Casting(?), the company that's doing the web cast today. That web cast will continue to be available on the website that we've established here at the university, for at least another 30 days, and we will take a temperature of the use of the web cast on an ongoing basis, and perhaps go back to some of our generous funders to look for ways to keep that alive. The website as well will continue to exist, no longer as a promotional vehicle for this event, but as a research platform on the issues that we've dealt with today. Before I leave the technical domain, I really have to thank the instructional media services staff here at Carleton University. Everything has run to perfection, and it simply couldn't have happened without their help.

There are a number of ongoing activities that spring from this event, and I encourage you to please keep in touch, all of those who have come here to speak, and everyone who has come to listen, pick up on some of these themes, please. The papers presented today will be posted to the website in their entirety, probably not tomorrow. We may take a day or two off, but they will be posted to the website very soon. The summer project for this symposium team is the publication that will flow from this event, and we will formalize, edit, incorporate the material from the conference into the papers, and produce a publication from that.

There are a couple of other initiatives. We would like to create here at Carleton something that we will probably call "The Media and Genocide Research Archive." There have been a lot of references to the kind of material, both involving the domestic media in Rwanda, and international media coverage of the genocide that exists. Some of this material is disappearing. Someone asked me the other day about an issue of Kangura newspaper. They couldn't put their hands on it. We have the capability to capture all of that material. I think we should put it in one place. I think we should find a way to have BBC digitize all of Mark Doyle's reports, and deposit them with the archive. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation should do the same thing if they're listening to this event. All aspects of media coverage. We have extensive material from RTLM, from Kangura that's been assembled for the purposes of the International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda for the Media Trial, that material has been captured, and it's available on CD-ROM. I think we will lodge this material in an archive here at Carleton, hopefully make as much of it as possible available through the website.

I mentioned at the opening today, we also invited representatives of the National University of Rwanda, the School of Journalism to join us here today. I think we really have to look at ways of sharing resources, sharing people. If Chris Dornan, my chair is still here, I would love to go next summer and teach a course at the National University of Rwanda in Butare. That's something I think we really need to explore.

Finally, another initiative that has sort of emerged from the corridors, Willy Rangira who is a representative of the Humura Association here in Ottawa has made a brilliant suggestion that we should use the resources of perhaps the School of Journalism and it's students to begin to create an archive of testimonials of Rwanda genocide survivors. We could begin with those who live in the capital region. We could perhaps expand this across the country. It could be as simple as student journalists showing up at people's homes, and practicing their interviewing skills, and

recording at the same time these important testimonials about the genocide before they're lost to us. And by the way, the Humura Association, which is helping us host this reception upstairs as soon as I stop talking is also holding a series of commemorative events itself, particularly on April 6, a candlelight vigil on Parliament Hill. For more information on that, go to their website humura.ca.

I'm sort of running out of words, so I'm going to very quickly close the event. I really want to thank a number of people though. I would like to thank my students for tolerating the quintessential, absent-minded professor for the last few weeks. I promise that I will get those assignments marked. I would very much like to thank my wife, Rula Al Rafaid(?), who is here today, and for allowing me to be also the absent husband, and particularly I would like to thank the woman, who I've actually seen more of in the last month than my wife, Claire Fitzpatrick. If she could sort of step into the limelight where people can see the person, who really made this event happen. Thank you. I'd like to thank Romeo particularly, among the speakers for being sort of the moral conscience, I think, behind this issue, and to a large degree behind this event. Romeo presents, for a journalist, the more you get to know this man, he presents you with a very real journalistic conundrum. How do you write about someone with any degree of distance when you have come to admire them so much, and it is a journalistic conundrum, which I hope to continue to confront. I apologize that this event has been heavy on content, and short on ceremony. So there is no elaborate closing. I would like to once again thank all of the participants. Many people have come a great distance to be here, and they have given so much of themselves today. A lot of these presentations have been very, very personal. It's been short, but I think there's been a certain magic of the moment to this event.

Myself, I came to Rwanda late. I wasn't there in 1994, unlike my colleague, Jeff Salot from the Globe and Mail, who was there, and I think certainly that experience changed his life. I visited Rwanda first in 1996 as a journalist, as part of this repatriation exercise, and it did get inside of me, and since then, I think to some degree I maybe have been trying to make amends for not having been there in 1994. In going through the Toronto Star archives, I actually found an article from April 9, 1994, that I had completely forgotten even having written, and I think I know why it left my memory, it was awful. It was an awful piece of journalism. I had just taken up my position in the Toronto Star's Ottawa bureau, and my article three days into the genocide was about the evacuation of Canadian expatriates from Kigali. It invoked every cliché of tribal conflict, chaos, anarchy, every mistake you could imagine, the kinds of mistakes that we've been talking about today. I hope that I have improved with time.

We've accomplished a great deal today. I wish I could echo Gerry Caplan, who said, "never again." I think in speaking of a lot of these journalistic errors, or exercises, or lessons learned, I don't think we can honestly say, "never again," because we're making the same mistakes right now. You could count on your left hand the number of Canadian journalists, who are based in Africa, and honestly I don't know what stories that we're missing out there right now.

I think it was Voltaire, if I'm correct, who said, "that to the dead we owe only respect. To the living, we owe the truth." True to form as a journalist, I've probably misquoted him, but that's the gist of it. I would submit that to the dead we also owe the truth, and with a bit more truth maybe, just maybe there wouldn't be so much death.

I would like to close, if I could ask those in charge of the technical magic in this room, if we could lower the lights. I think the best way to close this event is with a brief video montage that's drawn largely from archival media footage from the period in Rwanda in 1994. I have to warn you that many of these images are very disturbing, and they should be. They should be disturbing. Thank you. Thank you very much.